Hitler’s senior generals had been pleading with him to follow a defensive strategy, Bevin Alexander explains (in How Hitler Could Have Won World War II), ever since the failure to capture Moscow in December 1941:
Victory, of course, no longer was possible. But Germany might have achieved a standstill in the west if Hitler had transferred much of his army and air force to challenge landings by the western Allies. By husbanding his forces in the east, and above all by avoiding an offensive that might consume his little remaining striking power, he also might have held back the Soviet Union until everyone was weary of war.
But such a reversal would have required Hitler to see that he had made mistakes — and this Hitler could not do. On the contrary, he began in the spring of 1943 to concentrate every man, gun, and tank possible for a final confrontation with the Red Army in the Kursk salient northwest of Kharkov.
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German generals in the Mediterranean were seeing that the principal Allied commanders were hesitant, slow-moving, and insistent upon overwhelming superiority before they undertook operations. Allied obsession with security played directly into the strengths of the German army. Compared to Allied commanders, German generals were, on balance, bolder, more flexible, more inventive, more willing to take chances, and more confident of their ability to overmaster opponents.
A couple of decisions illustrate the attitude of Eisenhower, Alexander, Montgomery, and other senior commanders. First, though no one expected much opposition, they earmarked ten divisions for the invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky), more than they were later able to get on the beaches of Normandy. Second, they insisted on attacking the Italian boot at Salerno because it was within the 200-mile range of Spitfires operating from northeast Sicily. Since the Germans knew about the Allied fixation on air cover, they spotted Salerno as the target and prepared a gruesome reception there.
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The key to Sicily was the narrow Strait of Messina (in Greek mythology guarded by Scylla and Charybdis), less than three miles wide, which divides the northeastern tip of the island from the toe of Italy (Calabria). Any supplies to and evacuation from Sicily had to pass this bottleneck.
Since the Allies held command of the sea, the way to assure the capitulation of the enemy on Sicily without firing a shot was to invade the toe of Italy. There were virtually no Axis troops in Calabria. Its occupation would have separated Sicily from the mainland and prevented the evacuation of troops from the island — except those few who might have been flown out.
This idea never received serious consideration.
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Instead, Eisenhower approved a completely frontal attack.
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It took Eisenhower and his senior generals until May 13 to finish their plans. Yet, since only one of the divisions intended for Husky was being used in the last stages of the Tunisian campaign, the invasion could have followed directly on the heels of the Axis surrender. If this had happened, the attackers would have found the island virtually bereft of defenders and could have seized it almost without casualties.
Yes, Husky was the biggest naval invasion in history. Most think it was D Day.
The reason for Sicily was the same as Salerno. Air power cover.
I would probably have taken Sardinia and Corsica and then made a strong landing in Southern France (bigger than operation Dragoon) or in western Italy, above Rome.
Yes, the German side (and specifically Hitler) made some bad mistakes. But WWII was mainly Germany, Italy, Japan versus the British Empire, USSR, and USA. Hitler’s side was out-numbered, out-resourced, out-produced. Hence the Allies eventually won — despite making many of their own mistakes.
It is basically the same dynamic we are seeing today in the Ukraine. Absent some real military snafus, the side with the greater active manpower, accessible resources, and domestic production capacity is likely to prevail.
“Victory, of course, no longer was possible. But Germany might have achieved a standstill in the west if Hitler had transferred much of his army and air force to challenge landings by the western Allies.”
First, by late, pretty much the entire Luftwaffe was fighting over Germany trying to mitigate the damage from bombing, so there were no air forces to spare. Second, the Germans did transfer a lot of their strength and many of their best units and supplies, to the west. It wasn’t enough, and it was never going to be enough because no matter how many divisions the Germans sent to the west, they were going to get obliterated by allied air power.
But even if we assume that some stalemate could be achieved in the west, what good would that do Germany with Stalin marching in from the east? That still leaves a surrounded Germany being reduced to rubble from the air, increasingly short on food, manpower, oil, and other vital resources.
”But even if we assume that some stalemate could be achieved in the west, what good would that do Germany with Stalin marching in from the east? That still leaves a surrounded Germany being reduced to rubble from the air, increasingly short on food, manpower, oil, and other vital resources.”
I suppose the thinking was that an eastern stalemate along Belarus/Ukraine; and western invasions stopped on the beaches; there would have been enough resources for an indefinite holdout towards a peace with a remnant of empire.