In Group Power, Arnold Kling looks into Meir Kohn’s research into the political development of Europe — and its implications for Iraq, Africa, and even the US:
Kohn arrived at his theory of associational government in the process of undertaking a broader study of the economic history of late medieval Europe. He describes it as a contest between two types of polities, beginning in the latter 1400′s.On the one hand, larger territories had economies of scale. They were badly ruled by autocrats, but their sheer size enabled them to raise powerful armies. These were predatory states.
On the other hand, city-states had an advantage in that they were well run. Rulers were not absolute. There were many checks and balances within the smaller polities. These were associational city-states.
As the autocratic states, such as France and Spain, required more revenue to finance wars, they tended to concede power to other elites. Thus, they became slightly less autocratic. Meanwhile, as the city-states attempted to merge in order to protect themselves, governments would tend to become more predatory. However, in some exceptional cases, notably the Netherlands and England, an “associational state” emerged, which combined the limits on governmental predation of the smaller polities with the military defense capability of the larger polities.