Harvard professor Barton Whaley’s study of strategic deception, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations explains, led him to make certain recommendations:
Most deception in the twentieth century was supported by communications and other electronic media. Only 23 of the 115 deceptions that Whaley investigated from 1914 to 1968 involved naval operations, such as Pearl Harbor and Midway, and most of those dealt with amphibious assaults, such as the Normandy invasion.
Nevertheless, many of Whaley’s general conclusions regarding successful deception are robust for fleet tactics and campaigns as well. His prescriptions include
- Reinforcing preconceptions or expectations of the enemy commander; then do something different.
- Using deception, which he says is a low-risk endeavor, whether it works or not.
- Using multiple false clues—say up to six—because some clues will not reach the enemy decision-maker, and using more than one clue adds credibility to the ploy.
- Employing strategic deception does not cost much in forces or dollars, but it involves some devoted thinking by the deceiver and his staff. It is not certain that tactical deception will be similarly inexpensive in terms of the number of forces that are needed to achieve it.