Modern war seems to be of a somewhat different character from the classical ones

Saturday, October 7th, 2017

The toy problem presented in Techniques of Systems Analysis starts with a reasonable criterion of efficiency — the average damage inflicted:

This might be sensible if we were going to fight a series of wars, one after the other, and we wanted to maximize the total damage done in all of these wars. Modern war seems to be of a somewhat different character from the classical ones. Our major interest is probably in winning the next one and letting later ones take care of themselves. In particular, the first blow may be so overwhelmingly decisive that we may wish not to maximize the damage done on the average on this first blow, but wish instead to maximize our probability of achieving a satisfactory level of damage.

At first sight, these two objectives may not seem very different. As a matter of fact they often are. In particular what we do depends on what level of damage we consider satisfactory. If, for example, we try to operate in such a way as to maximize the probability of achieving say 30% damage, we will concentrate our attack on one field and lose completely our capability of achieving 60% damage. On the contrary, if we try to maximize our probability of achieving 60% damage, we must attack both fields. This may reduce appreciably our probability of achieving at least 30% damage.

Deterrence vs Win the War

Before discussing in detail exactly how incompatible the two objectives are, let us consider one reason why one might want to achieve 30% or 60% damage. It is generally recognized that the major objective of the armed services today is not to win the war if it breaks out but to prevent war from breaking out. One way to do this is to make it clear to the enemy that he cannot win the war. If we can convince the enemy that if he starts a war he will be destroyed, irrespective of whether or not he destroys us, then it presumably will not pay him to start a war. We say that he is deterred from starting a war. This deterrence mission has been publicly stated to be the primary miss of SAC.

Presumably one way to achieve this kind of deterrence would be for our forces to destroy a sufficiently large portion of his forces so that his later attacks will be too small to overwhelm us completely. This would correspond to having as an objective not maximizing our probability of winning the war handsomely but only maximizing the probability that he will not win the war handsomely. We shall assume that this last objective corresponds to achieving 30% damage.

The other objective, winning the war handsomely ourselves, would correspond to a 60% level of destruction. That is, we shall assume that if we destroy this percent of the enemy’s forces, our active and passive defenses are sufficiently effective to cope adequately with whatever he can then send against us.

[...]

We might figure, given that the war has broken out, that there is not much to be gained in mutual suicide. Unfortunately, in the real world one cannot make this decision after the war has broken out because the decision involves doing things which cannot be changed at the last moment. If one takes deterrence seriously, on might well plan on what is practically a contingent mutual suicide in the hope that the plan will prevent the contingency from occurring.

Comments

  1. Kirk says:

    This calculus presupposes the fallacious and fantastic idea that all parties to a war are rational actors who carefully assess cost/benefit ratios before making the decision to go to war. And, to boot, that they continuously monitor and assess the conflict while it is going on, on a basis of rationality…

    I think that to even posit this idea as an exercise in mental masturbation is something that only an intellect disconnected from reality could manage. Hell, I can think of a bunch of examples without even walking over to the reference shelf, where no such rational thought took place before initiating hostilities.

    Deterrence only works with the sane. The insane, the fanatical? LOL… Lemme know how all that carefully calculated thinking works out, in the end.

    And, they also leave out the little issue where the question of what is rational is something that has to be shared by both sides, in order for this to work. Pre-WWII Japan, anyone? Modern North Korea? What looks irrational to us, on our side, may be entirely rational to the other side. Perception of this quality of conflict differs considerably, between potential combatants. The Paraguayan War of 1864 springs to mind, where Paraguay lost some 70% of it’s military-age male population. Anyone care to explain how all this “rational” stuff would have worked with the likes of Francisco Solano Lopez?

  2. Lu An Li says:

    “It is generally recognized that the major objective of the armed services today is not to win the war if it breaks out but to prevent war from breaking out.”

    At least since WW2 the paradigm has been unconditional surrender or nothing? An American perspective that is at odds with most other wars of the past that had negotiated settlements?

  3. Adar says:

    “The Paraguayan War of 1864 springs to mind, where Paraguay lost some 70% of it’s military-age male population. ”

    Wasn’t this the Gran Chaco War of the 1930′s?

  4. Kirk, I think it’s important to remember that the excerpt is referring specifically to the concept of nuclear deterrence and that the standard of rationality used here is merely “functioning sense of self-preservation” on the part of the leadership.

    One of the interesting lessons of the modern era is that once countries acquire nuclear weapons they seem to become suddenly more rational about initiating the large-scale use of force. How many World Wars since 1945, for instance? The USSR was pretty aggressive about territorial aggrandizement for its first 30 years, but once A-bombs got to be involved Soviet leaders decided to settle for proxy-conflicts and ideological subversion for the remaining 45. Israel’s neighbors seem more reticent to start major wars since it became known that Israel has nuclear weapons, and Israel itself has followed a less adventurist foreign policy. Similarly, the Indo-Pakistani conflict cooled considerably once both sides gained nuclear weapons.

    There’s a big difference between rolling the dice on a conventional conflict, where some other mothers’ sons will be doing the bleeding out of sight of the elite and failure is both slow in coming and survivable, and taking a chance on a nuclear conflict wherein a misstep risks the annihilation of the nation, culture, and (most importantly to my cynical mind) the ruler(s) themselves. The reality that there would be no proud warrior’s death, just extermination carried out one settlement at a time, one bomb at a time, was an important part of what finally broke Imperial Japan’s will. Such weapons have taken much of the seeming glory out of conquest and, perhaps more importantly, have taken the dignity out of an “honorable defeat.” Even a Lopez or a Hitler is rational enough to wish to avoid almost instantaneous death on any but the surest bet.

    I definitely agree that there are exceptions. True fanatics or madmen, as you point out; those who don’t fear death of their selves or nations. The two most common examples I see suggested are North Korea and Iran. In the former, so far I see Kim as having acted with scrupulous rationality in acquiring exactly what he needs to keep from getting Qaddafi-ed, and in using it to the utmost to try and extract concessions. The fear there is a miscalculation on someone’s part, that his bevy of yes-men will tell him he really can deflect American warheads with his good looks or some such.

    In reality, though, this makes a perfect test case for the concept of deterrent explored above. Would having no nuclear weapons on the opposite side make him less likely to attack? Would you say that the prospect of overwhelming retaliation makes him more likely to gamble on using his new toys? Of course not. As the old joke goes, “I’m crazy, not stupid.”

    Iran is different, partly because of the explicit martyrdom complex built into Islamic culture. It’s much harder to say how seriously the leadership takes the ideology, but I think it would be very dangerous to simply assume they’re cynical about it. That said, it seems hard to argue that the prospect of nuclear retaliation by the objects of their hatred has no braking effect on their willingness to escalate things to that level.

    I suppose what I’m trying to say is that the baseline assumption that other countries aren’t run by people who are eager to die is probably a decent starting point for international relations and strategic planning, which is all Kahn and Mann are saying. We should, however, always be vigilant to possible exceptions.

  5. Kirk says:

    “I suppose what I’m trying to say is that the baseline assumption that other countries aren’t run by people who are eager to die is probably a decent starting point for international relations and strategic planning, which is all Kahn and Mann are saying. We should, however, always be vigilant to possible exceptions.”

    It’s those exceptions that one most needs to account for, when thinking about these issues. You go through life thinking “A rational person wouldn’t do “X”…”, and then you run into that irrational person who actually will do “X” with enthusiasm, and you’re suddenly trying to figure out how to survive meeting that nutter with a knife that you’ve always discounted being a real potential…

    My experience is that one should always think anyone capable of anything, and to expect that the average human is capable of extraordinary irrationality. Preparing accordingly is only prudent.

  6. I submit that better than 99 out of a 100 people are rational enough to be substantially less likely to aggress against someone they know is heavily armed. Similarly, substantially less likely to shoot at someone they think has a good chance of surviving to shoot them back.

    I think deterrence has a greater chance of breaking down due to not-irrational reasons, like desperation. If they thought there was a near certainty of dying anyway, Kim and his cronies (for instance) might very well push the button out of pique.

    Of course, as Isegoria will probably excerpt at some point, this is why Kahn et al. argue that you do need to be able to actually win the war if it happens, contra the deterrence-only MAD philosophy which was in vogue when they were writing. Hence their support for robust civil defense, ABM, conventional forces, etc.

  7. Isegoria says:

    I think it’s important to recognize the difference between rational in everyday language and rational in a mathematical model, where it really doesn’t mean much more than we can model it. Game theory includes many rational actors behaving “irrationally” in the everyday sense.

  8. Isegoria says:

    This talk of rationality and deterrence reminds me of a passage from Theodore Dalrymple’s classic The Rush from Judgment:

    My patients medicalize both their own misery and the terrible conduct of their violent lovers, a way of explaining their existential dissatisfaction that absolves them of responsibility. It takes little time, however, to disabuse them of their misconceptions, and the fact that I am often able to predict from very near the outset of our consultation how their lovers have behaved toward them astonishes them. Last week I saw a patient who had taken an overdose after her boyfriend beat her up. Our dialogue followed a set pattern.

    “And, of course, he sometimes grabs you round the throat and squeezes and tries to strangle you?” I ask.

    “How did you know, doctor?”

    “Because I’ve heard it practically every day for the last seven years. And you have marks on your neck.”

    “He doesn’t do it all the time, doctor.” This is the universal extenuation offered.

    “And, of course, he apologizes afterward and tells you it won’t happen again. And you believe him.”

    “Yes. I really think he needs help, doctor.”

    “Why do you say that?”

    “Well, when he does it, he changes completely; he becomes another person; his eyes stare; it’s like he has a fit. I really think he can’t help it; he’s got no control over it.”

    “Would he do it in front of me, here, now, in this room?”

    “No, of course not.”

    “Then he can help it, can’t he?”

  9. Kirk says:

    “I submit that better than 99 out of a 100 people are rational enough to be substantially less likely to aggress against someone they know is heavily armed. Similarly, substantially less likely to shoot at someone they think has a good chance of surviving to shoot them back.”

    Sooo… How do you determine which one is which, when dealing with people in dynamic situations? Do the crazies wear special hats, or have other readily distinguishable features?

    If they do, I’ve somehow missed that memo. Instead, what I’ve found is that when someone says they’re going to do something, it’s best to take them at face value and evaluate accordingly, ‘cos sure as hell, if they’re talking about it, they’re thinking about it, and it’s a short step, indeed, between thought and action.

    Historically and in international relations, this has also been the case. You rarely run into cases where the nutters come out of the blue, without telegraphing their intent and eventual actions. You have a Hitler rave in print about the Jews, and making room for the German Volk, the prudent thing to do is take him at face value and respond accordingly.

    This is, sadly, a lesson that escapes every new generation of leadership. It also escapes the general public.

    Remember the old Saturday Night Live sketch about the murderer of Eddie Murphy’s character Buckwheat?

    (transcript of sketch)

    [FADE to black, then FADE IN on a photo of a white one-story house.]

    Ted Koppel: [off camera] John David Stutts spent his childhood here in this modest home in Lima, Ohio.

    [CUT to photo of Stutts sitting on his couch again. Photos of the "Our Gang" cast and a photo of Buckwheat from "SNL" are seen on the wall.]

    Ted Koppel: Everyone who knew him called him a loner: a quiet young man.

    [CUT to photo of a simple church.]

    Ted Koppel: Stutts attended Sunday School at the Mercy Seat Baptist Church.

    [A black minister sits at a desk with a Roman collar.]

    Minister: He was a loner, and a quiet young man. He attended church, and Sunday School. I remember he was always very polite.

    Ted Koppel: Do you believe he killed Buckwheat?

    Minister: Oh, yes. Definitely. That’s all he talked about.

    [CUT to the exterior of a brick school building.]

    Ted Koppel: John David Stutts graduated from Unionville High School.

    [CUT to a yearbook photo showing Stutts sitting alone at a desk. The caption above the photo reads, "THE LONER."]

    Ted Koppel: His classmates called him “the loner.”

    [CUT to a photo of Eddie Murphy's face pasted over some white guy's face in a group shot from a yearbook.]

    Ted Koppel: Stutts was a member of the Key Club…

    [CUT to a similar photo of a smaller group.]

    Ted Koppel: The Audio-Visual Squad…

    [CUT to Stutts holding a rifle in front of a blackboard.]

    Ted Koppel: And president of the Future Assassins of America.

    [CUT to a formal yearbook photo of Stutts gazing dully into space. The caption below reads: "John David Stutts, Most Likely to Kill Buckwheat."]

    Ted Koppel: It’s no wonder that his classmates chose him, “Most Likely to Kill Buckwheat.”

    [CUT to a middle-aged, mustached man in a blue windbreaker standing in front of gas pumps.]

    Gas Station Attendant: [in New England accent] Sure, I remember Stutts. He was a loner, but a real hard worker. I mean, he pumped the gas, he checked the oil, he washed the windows. Nice kid.

    Ted Koppel: Do you believe he killed Buckwheat?

    Man: Oh, yes, definitely. That’s all he talked about. I remember one day I says, uh, “Stutts, why are you working so hard?” He says, “‘Cause I’m saving up to buy a gun, so I can kill Buckwheat.” [shrugs]

    [CUT to a tailor hemming the cuffs on a pair of slacks.]

    Tailor: John was a quiet boy, a kind of a loner. But real polite. He always stood still when I hemmed his cuffs. Nice kid.

    Ted Koppel: Do you believe he killed Buckwheat?

    Tailor: Oh, yes, definitely. That’s all he ever talked about. Why, just the other day, he comes in and he says, “Saul, make me a new suit. I’m going to kill Buckwheat, and I want to look good on television.”

    [CUT to the still photo of Stutts gazing dully from the couch.]

    (end transcript)

    Sadly, that sketch is truer to real life than most of us would like to admit. We discount the crazies, evaluating them in terms of what we would do, in their shoes, never grasping or internalizing the fact that they’re not creatures “just like us…”.

  10. Kirk, I don’t think anyone is claiming you should discount such threats. They’re usually pretty good indicators on their own that you’re dealing with a dangerous individual or group. What we’re talking about is making it very immediately and personally expensive to carry through on them.

    If both Poland and Germany had somehow been armed with a respectable nuclear deterrent in 1939, do you think Hitler would have gone ahead and attacked anyway?

  11. Kirk says:

    “If both Poland and Germany had somehow been armed with a respectable nuclear deterrent in 1939, do you think Hitler would have gone ahead and attacked anyway?”

    Review Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, and contemplate the level of self-deception and outright delusion endemic to the entire Nazi movement. WWII largely happened when and how it did due to the fact that Hitler and the Nazis were running out of “other people’s money” to finance their LARP activities in Germany. Objective, rational thought would have said “Yeah… War? As a solution to our problems…? Nope. Too risky.”. Unfortunately, the irrational won out over the rational, and we got what we got. No doubt, there were plenty of “sane, rational” types calculating in the various European governments facing the Germans, but… Sane and rational don’t cut it, when dealing with the world’s nutballs. Hitler and the Nazis only got as far as they did because the “sane” people discounted their potential.

    Do note the parallels between the Soviets using Hitler as a cat’s paw in dealing with the Western democracies like France, and what the Chinese have been doing with the North Koreans. Use of the crazed as tools to further your national ambitions isn’t either new or unique in history–Nor is having it blow up in your face. I wonder just what Nicholas II would have made of the end results of the Russian intelligence services playing with the Black Hand in Serbia, had he known ahead of time how it would all end for him and his loved ones?

    I don’t think the possession of nuclear arms would have made a difference for Poland. They were, unfortunately, sane people dealing with a a madman and his fellow lunatics. Who would have foreseen the things that Hitler and the Nazis did in Polish territory during the war, or that the Soviets would act against their own interests as much as they did?

    Most of the politicians in the West were operating at a severe disadvantage when dealing with Hitler; they did not grasp that he meant everything that he said, and that he was fundamentally functionally insane within the context of the diplomatic world they knew.

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