Victor Davis Hanson has argued that the western way of war — based on engaging the enemy in a decisive battle, rather than a series of skirmishes — led to western world dominance.
Peter Turchin could not disagree more:
Winning a battle is a very small part of winning a war. In fact, many wars were won despite losing all the battles. The Romans prevailed over Hannibal in the Second Punic War even though Hannibal smashed them in battle after battle. After the disaster of Cannae perhaps a third of Romans of military age were wiped out, and even a greater proportion of the ruling senatorial class was destroyed (yes, at that time the Roman senators fought and died in the first ranks). Nevertheless, the Romans ultimately prevailed. Similarly, in 1812 Napoleon won all the battles against the Russians, but it was his Grand Army that was ultimately destroyed and two years later Napoleon himself was deposed by the Allied Powers.
There is a great story about an exchange between two colonels, one American and the other Vietnamese in Hanoi, after the end of the US-Vietnam war (I am indebted to Ian Morris for bringing this quote to my attention). During their encounter, Colonel Summers told Colonel Tu, “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu thought about it for a few moments, and then said, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”
Now I don’t want to push this idea to the logical extreme. Winning battles is useful, but it is only one component, and not the most important, of winning wars. As career military officers like to repeat, “amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.”
Not one, but two gross oversimplifications by Turchin.
In the Roman case, he conveniently forgets all the battles and sieges Scipio won in Sicily and Spain, that beating and destroying in battle Carthage’s Spanish armies is the reason why he could turn the Numidians, and that it was Nero’s victorious battle against Asdrubal’s relief force that reduced Hannibal to a large-scale raider stuck in southern Italy by the still-spooked Romans.
As to Napoleon, the reasons why he isn’t still fighting in the Polish border in 1815 are mainly two and have little to do with the losses in Russia, which he was able to make good. What wrecked his plans was the German revolt that cut off his garrisons in Germany, a loss almost as big as the Grande Armée, and that just when he was wearing down the allies in repeated battles Wellington was able to force the Pyrenees, defeating in battle the French army that covered them. Of course, he was never overwhelmed in Spain because the guerrillas kept the French divided.
That said, in both cases the loss of a battle of Leipzig or Metaurus or some other would have led to a different result.
If this is case for winning wars without battles, it fails.
Napoleon made up his human losses in the Russian campaign easily enough, but he couldn’t make up his equine losses as easily. Dominic Lieven in his recent “Russia against Napoleon” documents how not having enough cavalry crippled Napoleon’s ability to conduct military operations in 1813-14.
Germans revolted because of the French disastrous defeat in 1812.
The Peninsular war was a sideshow. Naturally, the British historians wanted to claim some of the credit, but the facts of the matter is that it was the Russians who led (and held together) the coalition that defeated the Napoleonic empire.
Noticed you didn’t defend your Roman example.
If, unlikely as it may have been, Napoleon held in Leipzig, the fighting would have gone on in Germany for who knows how long.
The Peninsular War was a sideshow until 1813, when Napoleon’s southern flank was so degraded that Wellington could invade France. That’s a sideshow the same way that the left hand dagger in the gut is a sideshow.
What I meant, however, is that outside freaks like Vietnam, that can only happen when one side is inhibited to attack the true enemy, you have to balance a Fabian strategy with a capability to defeat the army that is savaging you, or resign yourself to skirmishing for years and years. Very well and good if you are a Mongol horde, but most settled societies can’t put up with it for even a generation.
Hanson specifically used Cannae as the example in his treatment of the reduction of Carthage by Rome. Using it against his thesis is pointless.
Despite the morality of using violence to achieve personal or political aims, the fact remains that Countries exist because of wars fought against their neighbours or rivals. Independence is largely secured through the employment of armed forces and the willingness to fight if threatened, this alone prepares us all for such an eventuality.
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