Isegoria

Never once, General Groves notes (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), was any definite country named as the one against which major security effort should be aimed:

At first it seemed logical to direct it toward the Axis Powers, with particular emphasis on Germany. She was our only enemy with the capacity to take advantage of any information she might gain from us.

Japan did not in our opinion have the industrial capacity, the scientific manpower or the essential raw material. Italy was in the same position, with the further disadvantage that any large plants would be exposed to Allied bombing attacks. We did not feel that information secured by Japan would reach Germany accurately or promptly, and we suspected that the Italian-German intelligence channels were not too smooth either.

I had learned within a week or two after my assignment that the only known espionage was that conducted by the Russians against the Berkeley laboratory, using American Communist sympathizers.

[…]

When I was first placed in charge of the MED I found that a number of people in the project had not as yet received proper security clearances, though some of them had been engaged in the work for months.

Any question of the trustworthiness of any one of these people was troublesome, for he would already be in possession of valuable information. To remove him would create only a greater hazard, particularly if he thought our suspicion of him unjustified. (I remembered that Benedict Arnold’s treason had been sparked by his feeling that he had been unfairly treated.) Moreover, if we were to dismiss a person without publicizing the proof, which we would not want to do, the understandable resentment of his friends and associates in the project might seriously interfere with their work.

Almost all our original scientific workers came from academic surroundings. Most of them had been in universities as students or young teachers during the depression years, when there was more than the usual amount of sympathy for Communist and similar doctrines. Almost all of them at one time or another had been exposed to Communist propaganda and had had friends who were secret or even semi-open Communists.

I realized what the temper of the times had been, even though I never had any sympathy for the philosophy or for the educated Americans who adopted it. Discussions with others experienced in this area led me to the belief that among those whose employment would be to the advantage of the United States a reasonable distinction could be made between individuals whose use might be dangerous and individuals whose use would probably not be.

We gave a great deal of weight to how closely the person had followed the party line and for how long. We were particularly interested in how closely he had followed the twists and turns of Soviet relations with Germany. In most doubtful instances this was a deciding factor.

Our problem was made much more difficult by the very limited number of qualified atomic scientists available in this country. We could not afford not to use everyone possible.

The most disastrous break in security was that resulting from the treasonable actions of the English scientist, Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs was born in Germany and had fled to England, where he completed his education. The British authorities had been informed by the Germans prior to the war that he was a Communist. For some reason they ignored this and did not even record the information where they would find it. After the outbreak of the war he was interned as an enemy alien, first in the British Isles and then in a prisoner of war camp in Canada. After some time there he was released and returned to work in England on atomic research. After his return he was made a British citizen.

Our acceptance of Fuchs into the project was a mistake. But I am at a loss when I try to determine just how we could have avoided that mistake without insulting our principal war ally, Great Britain, by insisting on controlling their security measures.

[…]

Since the disclosure of Fuchs’ record, I have never believed that the British made any investigation at all. Certainly, if they had, and had given me the slightest inkling of his background, which they did not, Fuchs would not have been permitted any access to the project. Furthermore, I am sure the responsible British authorities would have withdrawn his name of their own volition, before giving me his history.

If Dr. Chadwick had been in charge of the British mission at that time, as he was later, I am sure that no such deception would have been attempted. Chadwick was always most punctilious in informing me of the slightest question of background, including that of German blood. Unfortunately for the free world, Chadwick did not take over until a few weeks later.

[…]

I have always felt that the basic reason for this was the attitude then prevalent in all British officialdom that for an Englishman treason was impossible, and that when a foreigner was granted citizenship he automatically became fully endowed with the qualities of a native-born Englishman. With the uncloaking in recent years of Fuchs, May, Maclean and Burgess, as well as others, I doubt if this feeling still prevails.

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