Should be noted that the tank design in Germany also followed the infantry tank and the cavalry tank path while in those victories.

Because those were the actual niches. Yes.

So the change was in flux, it was organisational and tactical but not yet industrialised.

Organizationally, it was a kindergarten on the level of “Goering wants a toy too!” rarely seen outside cancerous bureaucracies and feminist-run corporations (see for example nu-Lucasfilm).

It’s just not clear what the author thinks is a good idea. Unless it’s «bread knife, butter knife, fish knife, meat knife… that’s too many, so as anyone who cannot count to five can see, optimization is bad».

In France the PZ IV had a short tube 75mm gun for anti infantry while the Pz III had only a 37mm gun at the time.

So the change was in flux, it was organisational and tactical but not yet industrialised.

For example, Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, an early advocate of a Military Technical Revolution, passionately (yet unsuccessfully) lobbied for his government to shift resources from armored forces to digital command-and-control networks and long-range precision-guided munitions.

Even beside the fact that Ogarkov led the Chief Directorate for Strategic Deception… how exactly someone would have «passionately lobbied» something in USSR?

for his government to shift resources from armored forces to digital command-and-control networks and long-range precision-guided munitions.

What exactly is this about?

Because this sounds like a “broken phone” version of the grand operation that made up the entire fake Soviet ABM system, to bluff SALT I into existence. This was indeed done by Ogarkov’s Directorate. While covering up ongoing development of missiles which would more or less blatantly violate SALT I. Of course.

That juicy story is in “Inside the Soviet Army” by Viktor Suvorov. BTW, there are darkly humorous mentions of the fake “ABM guidance station” building under Moscow in “The Inhabited Island” by brothers Strugatsky and “Babylon” by Viktor Pelevin.