A brilliant exposition of Sherman’s campaigns and how to win large wars. His mature thinking of dual objectives for multiple columns “put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma and either horn is worth a battle” wrongfooted the foe. Meanwhile Grant’s constant pressure on Lee in Virginia prevented any pivot south to face Sherman, if it were even possible for Lee to do so.

After the war President Grant and his strong right arm General of the Army Sherman, the highest military leader at the time, attempted to reform the Army procurement system so the next war the Army would be better equipped. These two were thwarted in this effort. Washington was probably never capable of reform, certainly if that duo failed.

I’ve just spent a few $ on this gem, and I’m looking forward to it. It is difficult to exceed the writing of BH Liddell Hart. His Colonel Lawrence* is similarly brilliant.

The Sword and the Pen Selections From the Worlds Greatest Military Writings — Sir Basil Liddell Hart

*FFS don’t use Lawrence of Arabia the movie as history. It’s a crime against all involved and totally untruthful.

Astonishing. It’s like reading a summary of Napoleon’s Italian campaign, almost to perfection. I had no idea of this Bourcet fellow, but it’s clear he had an impression upon, “the little corporal.”

Another of these inter-war thinkers who influenced the development of Napoleon’s corps d’armée system, was Jean de Bourcet. Bourcet’s Principes de la guerre des montagnes emphasized the necessity of dispersal to force the enemy to cover many different points, and he called for marching in order of battle. The dispersal of forces during the march was to be followed by a rapid concentration of forces at the decisive point before the enemy could do the same. This allowed the attacker to begin with a significant advantage during the ensuing battle. [13] The following excerpt from Bourcet’s writings could very well describe a Napoleonic campaign:

…a general will do well to divide his army into a number of comparatively small bodies, …which … is indispensable and safe provided the general who adopts it makes such arrangements that he can reunite his forces the moment that becomes necessary. He must therefore make his dispositions so that the enemy cannot interpose between fractions into which his army is divided…

A general who intends to take the offensive should assemble his army in three positions, distant not more than a march from one another, for in this way, while he will threaten all points accessible from any portion of the 25 or 30 miles thus held, he will be able suddenly to collect his whole army either in the centre or on either wing. The enemy will then be tempted to post troops to defend each of the threatened avenues of approach, and the attempt to be strong at all points will make him weak at each separate portion.

However carefully the enemy may have prepared his communications between several parts of his army, …in case of an attack at any point he will not be able to concentrate his troops there in time, if only the attacking general has concealed his plan and his first movements. The attacking general will usually be able to steal a march, …while the defender requires time to receive warning, time to issue orders, and time for the march of the troops to the point attacked.

I tend to think that autodidactic education doesn’t produce great men/thinkers, rather that great men/thinkers are inclined towards autodidactic practices. The curious and roaming mind makes demands on the world which the incurious and static mind does not.

Napoleon’s Letters (Prion Lost Treasures)
by J. M. Thompson (Author)

It’s in good 1930′s English. Not much military stuff, considering, just a brilliant polymath and incredibly high-powered executive making one important decision after another, seducing the most beautiful woman in Poland, facing victory and defeat implacably.