https://www.isegoria.net/2021/07/could-the-germans-have-taken-moscow/comment-page-1/#comment-3383764

Goring flat out lied to Hitler about the transport capability that he had. I believe this led to the loss at Stalingrad.

I think Hitler was overconfident about the gains in the USSR but on the other hand it’s hard to blame him for direct lies from Goring and getting rid of Goring would have been difficult. As noted he was a real war hero…at one time.

I say this over and over. I really believe that the lie about supply that he could provide at Stalingrad and the subsequent loss from lack of supplies turned the war against Germany. The Generals on the front at Stalingrad were saying they needed to pull back but Hitler was adamant that they not. Now I haven’t read this nor have documentation for it but suppose the guys at the front are telling Hitler they have no supplies or that they see none is coming in so decide they can not hold out Goring is right there next to Hitler telling him,”plenty of supplies” but in actuality he was not able to deliver.

People fault Hitler for not pulling back but “if” he would have known that the army had no food, no bullets, no gas, no supplies he might very well have made a good orderly retreat until supplies could be brought changing everything.

If your interested in WWII it would be worth reading
Goring by David Irving. It’s free on his site or used to be. I think where the supply situation is discussed and Goring’s lie is in that book but it is possible it’s in David Irving’s “Hitler” book but I’m 90% sure it’s in the Goring book. You’ll see where I’m taking about.

David Irving is I think one of the best if not the best WWII historian and his books read well also. He uses a lot of first person and unique data that he digs and digs for to get an accurate picture.

Of course all of this is just wild speculation as there were so many things going on all over as the whole world was involved in one way or another. So I’m just speculating like everyone else.

For one thing they would need to feel assured that open hostilities would not result in chaos for their logistical situation, which means the Arabia-India-Indochina corridor would need to be brought about in any case.

More broadly, they would need to feel that Soviet Russia is a weak and weakening horse, not a strong and strengthening horse. The main argument for a drive to Moscow seems, unless im misrepresenting this, to be that it would be a symbolic gesture sufficient to motivate such an impression.

On the other hand though, victories are victories, and defeats are defeats. Demonstrating the Soviets to be a weak horse would depend, naturally, on the capability of actually defeating their forces here or there, on carving up possessions of theirs here or there. And there is a whole continent’s worth of space for such acts. And more important that just isolated acts, is the implied trends of momentum. A victory that kills all momentum is just prelude to ultimate defeat. Which in turn again ties back into the importance of being able to interdict naval traffic to cut down their lines of supply.

Of course above all trusting the Communists to stay uninvolved if the opportunity to pounce on a target they feel they can get away with victimizing in a moment of weakness is a fool’s errand, and that conflict is both inevitable and necessary when such types are involved; but that is a matter of diplomacy, unrelated to one set of marching orders over another.

To put things in summary, I agree that arranging the involvement of Japan (and furthermore other countries as well) would have significant effect in the conflict; it is just that this is also an orthogonal matter to the utility of a drive to Moscow, which for the Heer would be throwing themselves to the brink of catastrophe, selling out with no way to capitalize on anything even if they succeed, for the sake of a target that would not be a significant aspect of the soviet’s warfighting capability anyways.

Not true. And the rest I covered when I said that less pressure on the German Eastern front due to Japanese attack meant they could step up control of the Med. which would cut them off.

“The U.S.S.R. attacked by Germany on June 22, 1941 and was declared eligible for lend-lease aid on November 7, 1941. Even before that date urgent supplies were sent to the Soviets with the help of 50 million dollars credit advanced by the United States government. The first convoy of American and British cargo ships steamed into the harbor of Murmansk…”

https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-much-of-what-goods-have-we-sent-to-which-allies

Here’s a map with tonnage. If the Japanese had attacked the USSR from the east, well, you see the problems for the USSR on this map. (And notice I didn’t say Siberia specifically. I said “from the US”. That I specified Siberia you made up.)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/img/BigL-p286.jpg

American supply lines were not going to Russia through Siberia in the first place though, so Japanese deciding to send their troops into the trackless tundra might makes waves in the Lügenpresse, but the Soviets could all but ignore it.

“The Arabs were not entirely unfavorable to the Nazis in the first place. Conquering them would not be necessary.”

Yes, that was part of the implication. There were a lot of neutral countries around the world that one could trade with, the existence of which being something else largely memory-holed by post-war tastemakers. As a truism, production of value depends on security of value. And Anglo escorts were just as liable to turning into Anglo pirates in order to encourage another party to “see things their way.” It’s all about being able to ensure your protection racket can elbow out other people’s protection rackets.

“the alleged ‘run down’ of the British Empire”

The theocratic Whigs maintained theocratic control over the gangrenous mass, as is particular to their character. In terms of material greatness and grandeur though, the empire absolutely did run down. A most emphatic illustration of the shift being their pathetic boondoggle in Afghanistan, a synchronistic rhyme with USG’s own symbolic death in the graveyard of empires.

The EIC officers that went into India with the simple intention of making a profit found people appreciative of the stability they provided; the parliamentarians who went into India for “purely altruistic” motives “out of the goodness of their hearts” intending only to “improve the lot of their lesser brothers,” found people detesting and defiant of them.

One of many subtle ironies furnished by modernity.

To preside as king over a crumbling pile of rubble is a recurrent character of leftism throughout the course of history; to pull things down into rubble in order to be king.

“In narrow terms victory of the Reich over Russia would depend on dominant control of sea-lanes… Atlantic Ocean to Gibraltar…”

“…linking up with the Japanese imperial sphere…”

I’m inclined to disagree with the first point because of the other two you mention. “If” Hitler had taken Moscow it might have spurred the Japanese to attack. This would split Soviet forces and possibly cut off a majority of supplies from the US. THAT would change things a lot. Possibly leaving more manpower and supplies for Hitler to take Gibraltar and that would really hurt the allies and the Russians. It could also lead to Hitler taking the middle east or at the least being able to have as much oil as he wanted. The Arabs were not entirely unfavorable to the Nazis in the first place. Conquering them would not be necessary.

The whole aspect changes. Instead of being tied down in Russia the Nazis would now be driving events.

I take it you’re a Jimian. Not saying you’re wrong, but there’s a decidedly Jimian vibe.

The main lynchpins propping up soviet communism were, to the north, lifesupport from American capitalism through the ports, and, to the south, supply of energy from the oilfields. Hitler was broadly correct in identifying the most economically valuable targets as also the most strategically valuable in the conflict (the collapse of transportation capacity and energy supply was itself a deathblow to the German warmachine); the devil of course, was in the details of how this idea would be expressed or prosecuted.

In broad terms the 4th Reich would have been well served by not starting a war at all – or at least by letting Stalin start it first; which, though Churchill and FDR both wanted war with fascist Germany (the former due to simple narrow-minded rivalrousness vis-a-vis their brother nation, the latter due to ideological madness), would have made it much harder to drag America into the conflict. Who, right up to the very end, had a large and significant isolationist attitude amongst the population – whose existence was largely memory-holed by the post-war false consensus (‘we have always been at war with eastasia’). The Fuhrer really scored an own goal by making Teddy’s little cousin’s job so much easier by declaring war on America himself first.

In narrow terms victory of the reich over russia would depend on dominant control of sea-lanes, at a bare minimum the areas around the North Aea to Arkanglesk, and around the Atlantic Ocean to Gibraltar, but of course the more the better. Either this strategic goal is emphasized and accomplished, or if not, you can just pack it up and forget about the whole business. The body that can provide for the security of traders prospers, while the body that cannot withers and dies. Attendant to and in similar spirit as this, another strategic lynchpin would be securing lines of commerce through the middle east, which would source oil and other key strategic resources, and also crucially linking up with the Japanese imperial sphere.

On an operational level, there is something to be said of the general staff idea of successive encirclement battles; but on a scale more like years, rather than weeks or months. The Rus, as has been noted, is very big. A given state in western Europe is rather small; one or two good offenses alone are often enough to decisively settle the fate of a campaign there. So rather instead, you have your smashingly successful offensive movement close to your logistical network, which is then parlayed into miles of elastic defense-in-depth, which the enemy may waste himself on if he wishes, while you bring your logistical network further up, whereupon the cycle repeats. Chief amongst this of course being the logistical network of the people themselves. As von Mellinthin relates:

“During the spring of 1943 I saw with my own eyes that German soldiers were welcomed as friends by Ukrainians and White Russians. Churches were reopened. The peasants who had been degraded to kolkhoz workers were hoping to get their farms back. The population was relieved to have got rid of the Secret Police and to be free of the constant fear of being sent to forced-labor camps in Siberia.”

Have you ever wonder how Xenophon could lead the Ten Thousand across the breadth of the near orient back to Greece, or how Alexander could lead his Macedons through the breadth of the near orient going the other way, even though this was nominally ‘enemy territory’, and their ‘lines of supply’ were so impossibly far from home? The answer is simple: they paid for it – and the merchants and peasants of the land *brought the stuff to them*.

(To a large degree, labouring caste men, and to a lesser extent merchant caste men, simply keep their heads down and bend whichever way the winds of power are blowing. This is a simple and easy strategy for ensuring the survival of a bloodline, which is why broad masses of most humanoid species are composed of this character. Playing for keeps, drawing lines in the sand, and never forgetting your enemies, are attitudes unique to priestly or warrior caste types. Which is also why men composed of latter constitutions are always ruling over men composed of the former.)

This has long and always been an ancient tradition of war in the west, the unique feature of the western way of war – the aryan way of war, you might even say.

The East India Company conquered the subcontinent because companies of merchant-adventurers wanted to trade; and in the course of provisioning security of trade, wound up following a chain of necessity that ended with the creation of the British Empire (but the one thing they failed to do was create a state church to go along with it; and lacking memetic sovereignty against the parliamentarian parasites back in London, lost control of that Empire to them – which in turn was quickly ran into the ground by those whig theocrats).

And, that’s about the short of it.