I’d call myself a humble student than anything else, seeking understanding. There’s a lot out there I just don’t know, and I wouldn’t seek to put myself out there as “the guy”, because I know I’m ignorant of a lot of things that I’ve come to consider vital to understanding this stuff, and that a lot of what I think I have figured out might be wrong.

Humility is what you learn after expounding on things you read from the “accepted experts” like Marshall, and then get slapped in the face by reality, as delivered by the men who were actually there. I’ve learned a bunch of that, the hard way. So… I’d hesitate to term myself any sort of “expert” on these issues.

I wish I knew enough about theory of warfare as you. I have enjoyed your commenting over the last few posts on infantry tactics. I only joined the Army out of need for finding my place after 9/11. I am out now, but you appear to know more than I ever did about warfare.

In my opinion, it isn’t correct to apply the lessons of crew-served weapons to individual ones, and that’s what we’re doing here. A crew-served solution is working within a team, is generally heavier, and is also usually mounted on a tripod or other support, firing at longer ranges than the quick snap-shot character of engagements with individual weapons.

In other words, it’s apples to oranges, all over again.

Sure, if all you’re worried about is hits generated, that’s all well and good. I’m not concerned about that metric, if the hits aren’t also inclusive of that little feature we term “stops”. That’s the essential problem with the XM-25 and other itty-bitty grenade launchers–The fusing and other things necessary to be in those warheads militate against enough payload to be deadly enough to be worth the while. The initial 20mm grenade fragments from the XM-25 were small enough and had such little energy that they were almost mere nuisances–They didn’t produce sure kills, which was what the guy firing it needed.

I’m not saying to go back to a full-house horse killer like the .30-06 (which was really the genesis of that round–It had to be lethal enough to take down cavalry mounts), but I am saying that the characteristics which make a good crew-served solution may not be the ones we need at the individual level. If you restrict me to something tiny and less-than-fully-lethal in service of reducing recoil to the point where it can be fired in hyper-burst mode to enhance hit probabilities, well… I’m not sure that is a really good idea. At all.

I think the Soviet/Russian mindless pursuit of the hyper-burst stuff, as typified by the AN-94, is really missing the point for individual weapons. As the US has found, you rarely really need even standard full-auto in an individual weapon, and when you do need it, the accuracy of it is secondary to the other effects you’re generating by going there. Except for those specific situations, carefully aimed semi-auto is much better, especially in scenarios where you’re having to follow a really restrictive ROE. If you’re a Russian, ROE doesn’t matter, ‘cos ain’t nobody gonna be calling you on collateral damage. If you’re US/UK, well… You’re gonna get called on it, big-time, and probably go to the ICC. So, for the US/UK, hyper-burst is a wasted effort anyway.

I think the whole “thing” surrounding what we’re equipping the combatants with needs to be looked at from first principles on up. The role and purpose of individual weapons needs to be re-examined, as well as the mix of crew-served weapons.

I’m almost of a mind that the individual soldier needs to be carrying a weapon that is less an offensive tool than a node in the communications network for spotting, identifying, and cuing targets for other weapons. Self-defense, and the occasional identified point target for the weapon component is about all we need to worry about, and the bigger piece is enabling all the other bits, like cross-talk between squad/section members and the higher authorities who authorize supporting fires.

The biggest piece of improving this lethality thing, to my mind, is enhancing observation/communication and decision-making for all concerned parties. The weapons are almost secondary, to be quite honest.

Consider the squad and platoon on the offense, in close-in terrain like a jungle: Individuals and teams move, but they cannot see each other, nor do they know where they are in relation to the enemy. Once an element has observed the enemy, they can’t easily communicate to their peers where they are, or that the enemy might in a position where another element might engage them without blasting the hell out of the original observer. The biggest gains in this idea of “lethality” are to be made with solving issues like this, and in making it possible for the leadership to grasp the details of the engagement, prioritize fires, and maneuver elements effectively.

To be honest, I think that a properly networked and communicative team would be exponentially more effective even with obsolete weapons, than someone carrying the latest and greatest from HK, FN, or Colt. The weapons are almost a secondary concern, going forward.