I think the era from about 1900 on to some point in the future will eventually seen as a period where a lot of the rules of how to go about doing things were periodically useless in various aspects of warfare. The technological flux in aviation, for example, was particularly strong in period from about 1935 to 1965, and then it settled down to be a hell of a lot more predictable–During the early days of that era, we just didn’t know what was possible vs. what was not, or how the new technology coming to fruition would work out, in the real world. Contrast that to the realm of small arms, where the ability to predict the capabilities and uses were much higher–And, we pretty much screwed that up, thinking that small arms were just like aviation, and trying to impose those rules on that arena. Otherwise, the whole SPIW fiasco wouldn’t have warped things the way it did.

Finding your way through the maze of advancing technology ain’t at all easy.

It’s amusing that we’re now working on the 2037 bomber, a high-altitude, high-mach penetration bomber that should properly have been the successor to the hundred-odd Valkyries we’d have in inventory now if only McNamara had thought things through a little more carefully. The operating experience and infrastructure would have saved us a boatload of cash.