Comments on: Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

By: Isegoria

Isegoria — Sat, 23 Apr 2016 19:23:30 +0000

Coolbert of Military Analysis adds this:

With regard to number four [bulldozers] we are speaking of the naval Construction Battalions. SeaBee’s [CB].

American advance across the Pacific in the aftermath of the Battle of Midway greatly facilitated by the actions of the CB’s.

At least within the Pacific Theater able within a period of two weeks to take an island pristine jungle wilderness and construct an airfield and all impedimental associated with same, a port facility and all impedimenta associated with same, barracks, mess halls, hospitals, etc.

CB personnel for the most part already trained and experienced trade union craftsmen upon entering the military. Trade unionists now wearing a uniform and highly qualified in their respective craft. Trade unionists to include carpenters, plumbers, electricians, masons, iron workers, and heavy machine operators.

Officers for the most part having civil engineering degrees and also experienced at their profession.

Officers and enlisted both merely given a mission and the raw material, and told to go. And did so with panache’ for which all ‘Americans can be most grateful.

By: Isegoria

Isegoria — Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:47:35 +0000

That's the paradoxical logic of strategy, Scipio.

By: Isegoria

Isegoria — Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:44:13 +0000

I believe the bulldozers were for building airfields — or unsinkable carriers.

By: Adam

Adam — Wed, 20 Apr 2016 08:08:53 +0000

Could someone clarify Admiral Halsey’s point about the vital role of bulldozers in the war in the pacific? Specifically why they rate alongside submarines, airplanes and radar?

By: Scipio Americanus

Scipio Americanus — Tue, 19 Apr 2016 14:13:40 +0000

Generally speaking, such single-thrust strategies are less effective and efficient than an initial analysis might suggest. For one thing, some proportion of the resources devoted to one strategic path can’t simply be redirected to another. For another, it wonderfully concentrates the mind (and resources) of your enemy upon the defeat of that single thrust. As Joseph Fouche noted on the old CoPS blog, successful strategy requires a significant degree of redundancy.

In the specific case of submarines vs. carriers, etc, one must keep in mind the basing requirements of the submarines (which will limit their ability to loiter in the core regions of the Japanese empire), the high probability that such a single-effort strategy will prompt the Japanese to actually pay attention to ASW and commerce-protection (which they largely ignored in reality), and that it will prompt the Japanese to develop alternate means of servicing their island garrisons (e.g. large aircraft).