Similarly, the property ritual allows new Schelling points to be constructed, which means the optimal arrangement can be approached.

Though note that the tree-cutter would simply have refused to cut the tree if the apple-giver were likely to welch. Rather than Schelling points allowing the tree to be cut, it’s that we can trust to some extent that allows a Schelling point to form and reinforce that trust. These feedbacks can get seriously complex.

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I will kudos myself because neither seems to have noticed that security spending is asymmetric. But only a little since I owe much to Szabo. (Which means Caplan’s comment section needs some remedial Szabo.)

WWII? Versailles etc, sure. But really? Offensive efficiency temporarily outstripped defensive, destabilizing property by damaging the strategic foundation.

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By contrast, I undercut this endowment effect stuff without much thought. It’s not a bias, it’s an instinct reflecting strategic reality. The experiments on it make it look like a bias by introducing unrealistic environments – it is not a surprise that evolution imperfectly prepares you for novel situations.

On the other hand, the descriptions of sparrows etc, especially children, is new to me, and that’s great. Great enough to repeat ‘great.’ Gintis should stick to reporting, not thinking.

Ooh, I bet I can play too.

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A sparrow facing an invader strategically sees a slider with two extremes: fight to the death or concede the nest. The invader sees the same slider.

The nest-maker’s downside risk is about equal on both extremes. Death, versus conceding not just that nest, but the ability to hold a nest and thus reproduce. Therefore, they should only care about upside risk. There’s no upside risk to not fighting.

Though I’m assuming away any ability for the nest-maker to evaluate the likelihood of success in a fight, in sparrows it will be 50% or so anyway.

The invader sees highly asymmetrical downside risks. Death versus nothing. Instead the upside risk is the same – the cost of a nest. Therefore, the rational sparrow uses invasion as a stupidity tax – are you dumb enough to surrender?

The only reason the butterflies didn’t try to kill each other is that they take into account the odds of a mistake, which change the risk calculation enough to push the slider off the extreme. (Similar to tit-for-two-tats in a noisy environment.)

For primates, security provides the asymmetry. Even having it in hand makes it harder for anyone else to grab, and thus victory favours the defence. This has to be weighed against resistance being seen as a dominance grab, on which security favours the other side.

“It is far from clear even in principle how unowned resources such as land can become private property”

Put a fence around it, get defensive advantage. Secure it, in other words. E.g. someone will Moon property when they can landscape it. Until then any ownership is clearly farcical.

“unjustly seized”

Statute of limitations. Property rights are ritualized in humans to avoid the costs of physically testing the security. Apart from even knowing accurately who unjusted who a hundred years ago, disputing it now only destabilizes the ritual by inviting everyone to make up past injustices. (Sound familiar?)

The only property rights that remain unjust indefinitely are ones that are impossible to justly secure.

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Alright, time to see how I did.

I’m betting Gintis enters at the level of justifying the ritual, though. I hope he doesn’t, but odds are not good. If so, he’ll make mistakes that can be caught and fixed by adjusting the ritual to the underlying security network.

Also trying to have an amoral account of the property rituals is like making an anhydrous account of a lake.