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	<title>Comments on: Cognitive Training</title>
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		<title>By: David Foster</title>
		<link>https://www.isegoria.net/2013/03/cognitive-training/comment-page-1/#comment-814718</link>
		<dc:creator>David Foster</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2013 18:10:24 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Here&#039;s a case in which simulator physical fidelity may well &lt;em&gt;have&lt;/em&gt; been important: the commuter airliner crash near Buffalo a few years back. When the stick pusher activated, the airplane&#039;s last-ditch defense against a stall, the flight crew reacted incorrectly, pulling back and overpowering the pusher. I &lt;em&gt;believe&lt;/em&gt; (but have not researched this carefully) that the simulator which had been used for training did not include a stick-pusher feature, if that is the case, then the pilot &amp; copilot had quite likely never experienced the physical sensations involved.

Also, it&#039;s reported that the crew had seen a video on tailplane icing, a condition under which the nose &lt;em&gt;would&lt;/em&gt; tend to drop and the proper recovery action actually would be back yoke. The NTSB apparently did not think this was a likely factor given the very short time interval between the stick-pusher activation and the pilot&#039;s pull on the yoie.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here&#8217;s a case in which simulator physical fidelity may well <em>have</em> been important: the commuter airliner crash near Buffalo a few years back. When the stick pusher activated, the airplane&#8217;s last-ditch defense against a stall, the flight crew reacted incorrectly, pulling back and overpowering the pusher. I <em>believe</em> (but have not researched this carefully) that the simulator which had been used for training did not include a stick-pusher feature, if that is the case, then the pilot &amp; copilot had quite likely never experienced the physical sensations involved.</p>
<p>Also, it&#8217;s reported that the crew had seen a video on tailplane icing, a condition under which the nose <em>would</em> tend to drop and the proper recovery action actually would be back yoke. The NTSB apparently did not think this was a likely factor given the very short time interval between the stick-pusher activation and the pilot&#8217;s pull on the yoie.</p>
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		<title>By: David Foster</title>
		<link>https://www.isegoria.net/2013/03/cognitive-training/comment-page-1/#comment-814664</link>
		<dc:creator>David Foster</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2013 16:25:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.isegoria.net/?p=31195#comment-814664</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Airline flight training on high-end simulators apparently does not currently include recovery from full aerodynamic stall.  Two main reasons for this: (a) difficulty in real-time modeling of the turbulent flows that exist over wings and control surfaces, and (b) the assumption that the goal should be to *prevent* stalls &#8212; recovery will lose altitude, and this can be dangerous if there is other traffic below you &#8212; and that with proper attention to avoidance, recovery will not be necessary. These assumptions, though, are receiving scrutiny, especially in the wake of the Airbus/Air France crash.

Perhaps a cognitive-training approach could be useful here: even if you&#039;re not modeling the stalled behavior of the airplane correctly, the recognition of a stall and the primary necessary recovery action &#8212; yoke or stick &lt;em&gt;forward&lt;/em&gt;, nose &lt;em&gt;down&lt;/em&gt; &#8212; could be reinforced.

On the other hand, the multiplicity of control modes on the Airbus may mean that the trainer would have to incorporate considerable detail as to the aircraft systems.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Airline flight training on high-end simulators apparently does not currently include recovery from full aerodynamic stall.  Two main reasons for this: (a) difficulty in real-time modeling of the turbulent flows that exist over wings and control surfaces, and (b) the assumption that the goal should be to *prevent* stalls &mdash; recovery will lose altitude, and this can be dangerous if there is other traffic below you &mdash; and that with proper attention to avoidance, recovery will not be necessary. These assumptions, though, are receiving scrutiny, especially in the wake of the Airbus/Air France crash.</p>
<p>Perhaps a cognitive-training approach could be useful here: even if you&#8217;re not modeling the stalled behavior of the airplane correctly, the recognition of a stall and the primary necessary recovery action &mdash; yoke or stick <em>forward</em>, nose <em>down</em> &mdash; could be reinforced.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the multiplicity of control modes on the Airbus may mean that the trainer would have to incorporate considerable detail as to the aircraft systems.</p>
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