Tuchman’s Stilwell reminded me of Hilaire du Berrier‘s Background to Betrayal. In both China and Vietnam, the Americans seemed baffled that their aid didn’t go directly to its stated purpose.

Until now [late '42 or early '43] I had regarded Stilwell as a romantic fighting man, and the best-informed U.S. officer on China. It would be a long while before I finally pierced his legend to discover his gullibility concerning the Communists and his prejudiced view of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Government of China, whose problems he never seemed to understand….

Everywhere Stilwell went there was a photographer present to catch him in brave poses: peering between leaves at the enemy, or snuggling close to a gun, always giving the appearance of being a field soldier, which was the role in which he so loved to be presented….

[Stilwell's] description of Chiang Kai-Shek remains etched in my memory although soon I was to realize how unjust, uninformed, and prejudiced it was. My notes confirm how he castigated the Chinese President as coolie class, arrogant, untrustworthy, and absolutely impossible to get along with.

The IWP is a school, a grad school, staffed with really bright folks — political scientists, historians, former policy wonks, former NSC and OSD staffers, and the like. Please check out their web site and thumb through the faculty bios. They do have public lectures, some of which can be found on CSPAN, etc. Enjoy.

I live in the D.C. region. Looks like this “IWP” is an institution of “red government” (red as in reactionary — Moldbug’s terms).

Does the IWP have functions one can attend?

There was soooo much fuzzy thinking in the USA foisted by bright propagandists for the Reds. A shameful bit of history. Glad that a light is being shone into that black hole.

Stilwell believed he could do much, much more with the hardy, uncomplaining Chinese soldiers than their own corrupt, incompetent commanders ever could, which would solve China’s most pressing problem, the Japanese occupation, while helping to solve America’s. What he couldn’t figure out was how to get the Chinese soldiers under his command — formal or informal.