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	<title>Comments on: Sichelschnitt</title>
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	<description>From the ancient Greek for equality in freedom of speech; an eclectic mix of thoughts, large and small</description>
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		<title>By: David Foster</title>
		<link>https://www.isegoria.net/2011/10/sichelschnitt/comment-page-1/#comment-359641</link>
		<dc:creator>David Foster</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Oct 2011 16:52:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Indeed, this campaign was &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; preordained to be a French defeat, as Americans tend to assume.

French historian Marc Bloch, who fought in WWI and volunteered for WWII (serving as a logistics officer) identified one of the main problems as slow decision-making: &quot;the metronomes at GHQ were set at too low a rate.&quot; Things happened a lot faster than they were expecting.

A valuable source on this campaign is General Andre Beaufre, who as a young captain served on the French staff between the wars and in 1940. His observation about the general staff&#039;s culture:

&lt;blockquote&gt;I saw very quickly that our seniors were primarily concerned with forms of drafting. Every memorandum had to be perfect, written in a concise, impersonal style, and conforming to a logical and faultless plan &#8212; but so abstract that it had to be read several times before one could find out what it was about… ”I have the honour to inform you that I have decided… I envisage… I attach some importance to the fact that…” Actually no one decided more than the barest minimum, and what indeed was decided was pretty trivial.&lt;/blockquote&gt;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Indeed, this campaign was <em>not</em> preordained to be a French defeat, as Americans tend to assume.</p>
<p>French historian Marc Bloch, who fought in WWI and volunteered for WWII (serving as a logistics officer) identified one of the main problems as slow decision-making: &#8220;the metronomes at GHQ were set at too low a rate.&#8221; Things happened a lot faster than they were expecting.</p>
<p>A valuable source on this campaign is General Andre Beaufre, who as a young captain served on the French staff between the wars and in 1940. His observation about the general staff&#8217;s culture:</p>
<blockquote><p>I saw very quickly that our seniors were primarily concerned with forms of drafting. Every memorandum had to be perfect, written in a concise, impersonal style, and conforming to a logical and faultless plan &mdash; but so abstract that it had to be read several times before one could find out what it was about… ”I have the honour to inform you that I have decided… I envisage… I attach some importance to the fact that…” Actually no one decided more than the barest minimum, and what indeed was decided was pretty trivial.</p></blockquote>
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