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	<title>Comments on: Psychology of the Russian Soldier</title>
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	<description>From the ancient Greek for equality in freedom of speech; an eclectic mix of thoughts, large and small</description>
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		<title>By: Isegoria</title>
		<link>https://www.isegoria.net/2011/07/psychology-of-the-russian-soldier/comment-page-1/#comment-308441</link>
		<dc:creator>Isegoria</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2011 00:05:48 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Certainly the German generals recognized that they were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of American artillery and air power &#8212; even if they didn&#039;t recognize the skill involved.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Certainly the German generals recognized that they were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of American artillery and air power &mdash; even if they didn&#8217;t recognize the skill involved.</p>
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		<title>By: Joseph Fouche</title>
		<link>https://www.isegoria.net/2011/07/psychology-of-the-russian-soldier/comment-page-1/#comment-307056</link>
		<dc:creator>Joseph Fouche</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2011 20:54:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Readers of Dunnigan&#039;s &lt;cite&gt;How to Make War&lt;/cite&gt; learn one of the most unknown facts of WWII: Time on Target (TOT). The TOT innovation allowed a single fire controller to bring down fire on a single Hun target from dozens of guns at the same time. British historian Max Hastings complains that American troops lacked training or fighting spirit, frequently stopping to call in artillery support instead of doing some clever Hun-style tactical maneuver on their own initiative. However, as Dunnigan pointed out, ~70% of Huns killed by American forces during WWII were killed by artillery fire. Stopping and calling for artillery support instead of fancy Hunnish heroics was playing to the GI&#039;s strength.

Tactical air was also a strong point. Looking at Patton&#039;s long open flank during his race across France in late summer 1944 on a map, it&#039;s easy to ask where all the krauts went. The answer is &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elwood_Richard_Quesada&quot;&gt;Elwood Richard Quesada&lt;/a&gt; commander of the Army Air Force tactical air support assigned to support the Third Army. He won Patton&#039;s support in spite of Patton&#039;s suspicion of flyboys and kept Patton&#039;s flank protected from whatever German forces concentrated to attack it. Quesada&#039;s tactics had similarities to TOT because it more closely integrated men on the ground with planes in the air.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Readers of Dunnigan&#8217;s <cite>How to Make War</cite> learn one of the most unknown facts of WWII: Time on Target (TOT). The TOT innovation allowed a single fire controller to bring down fire on a single Hun target from dozens of guns at the same time. British historian Max Hastings complains that American troops lacked training or fighting spirit, frequently stopping to call in artillery support instead of doing some clever Hun-style tactical maneuver on their own initiative. However, as Dunnigan pointed out, ~70% of Huns killed by American forces during WWII were killed by artillery fire. Stopping and calling for artillery support instead of fancy Hunnish heroics was playing to the GI&#8217;s strength.</p>
<p>Tactical air was also a strong point. Looking at Patton&#8217;s long open flank during his race across France in late summer 1944 on a map, it&#8217;s easy to ask where all the krauts went. The answer is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elwood_Richard_Quesada">Elwood Richard Quesada</a> commander of the Army Air Force tactical air support assigned to support the Third Army. He won Patton&#8217;s support in spite of Patton&#8217;s suspicion of flyboys and kept Patton&#8217;s flank protected from whatever German forces concentrated to attack it. Quesada&#8217;s tactics had similarities to TOT because it more closely integrated men on the ground with planes in the air.</p>
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