Comments on: The Ten Ships

By: Joseph Fouche

Joseph Fouche — Wed, 19 May 2010 03:16:01 +0000

Max Hastings, in his recent history of the Pacific campaign (Retribution), makes a good case that MacArthur’s campaign was redundant; only a country as wealthy as America, he argues, could afford to wage two different wars at once (MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s). The offensive in the central Pacific was the main event. MacArthur’s was an unnecessary sideshow except for the entertainment value of MacArthur himself. Hastings’ suggests that MacArthur wasn’t a great general but he played one with great aplomb. Island hopping and bypassing unnecessary strong points were a feature of both MacArthur and Nimitz. In the end, however, most of the damage to Japan was done by America’s unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan’s merchant marine.

By: Isegoria

Isegoria — Tue, 18 May 2010 21:35:36 +0000

I don't think the issue is whether the war in the Pacific was costly compared to the war in Europe, but rather whether is was costlier than it needed to be, knowing what we knew at the time. Mahan's insight is that navies don't control the ocean in the same way that armies control the land, because navies are tiny compared to the oceans they travel, while armies can form fronts along whole borders. Controlling territory in the South Pacific isn't valuable if the enemy can simply sail around you, but destroying his fleet lets you raid his shipping at your leisure. Land-based air forces complicate things, but it seems like denying the enemy the use of an airfield is much, much easier than seizing and supplying that same airfield. Certainly the American forces need some island bases on the way to Japan, but how many? And did MacArthur really implement the opposite of island hopping?

By: Foseti

Foseti — Tue, 18 May 2010 17:13:43 +0000

Here is MacArthur explaining his strategy:

My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed "island hopping" which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. "Island hopping" with extravagant losses and slow progress...is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.

By: Foseti

Foseti — Tue, 18 May 2010 17:10:50 +0000

It's not obvious to me that the war in the Pacific was particularly costly compared to the war in Europe. Deaths in the Pacific were roughly 25% of total US deaths (see World War II casualties and Pacific War). If anything that seems low. Casualties on a tiny island might have been high, but that tiny island may have effectively put the US in control of thousands of square miles of ocean - who's to say which metric of size is better. My understanding is that MacArthur's strategy was to cut off the Japanese supply lines. He skipped taking lots of islands, but he still had to take some islands to do this. He cut off everything south of the Philippines when he took it (i.e. he never invaded Singapore, for example). Getting close to Japan was also worth something, as it allowed the US to bomb the mainland.