Gen. DePuy describes the Division Restructuring Study, which became Division 86:
Division 86, which is what they now call it — we called it the Division Restructuring Study — is an effort to adapt our organization to new weapons which are more lethal and more complex. For example, the XM-1 tank, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), the Improved Tow Vehicle (ITV), the new air defense weapons, the attack helicopter, advanced tactical fighters, new artillery ammunition, TACFIRE, and other automated control systems, are, in most cases, as complicated or more complicated than World War II aircraft, which were all flown by officers. I say it is not too great a stretch of the imagination to have only lieutenants in XM-1 tanks. I could justify that. I am not suggesting that we do it right now. Frankly, I would suggest that we put warrant officers in as an immediate solution just to raise the quality of the tank commanders. If we already are having trouble in achieving full performance with the weapons we have today, and I maintain that we are having great difficulty in extracting the full potential from our weapons and from our organization, then we have to look for solutions.
There are two areas of solution and Division 86 is simply a reflection of that search. The first question we must answer is whether or not we intend to raise the quality of the operators to match the quality of the weapons. We just don’t have the last surviving corporal in charge of a XM-1 if you want to exploit the capabilities of the XM-1 any more than the Air Force would put the oldest surviving mechanic in the cockpit of an F-15. The Air Force would never consider it, yet we consider it every day. We even take people out of the orderly room and the mess hall and put them in tanks. The Air Force doesn’t do that. In the Army you buy quality by rank. If you can only get so much quality for $400 a month and you need to pay $1500 a month for the kind of quality you need, then what you are talking about is a lieutenant. If you are willing to pay $800 a month then you are talking about a sergeant. So, in the Army you get quality by raising the rank or increasing the rank mixture.
Now, because of the complexity of these weapons, both tactically and mechanically, the second thing you want to do is simplify the tactical training and maintenance responsibilities of the platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion commanders, to a level where they can cope with it. Right now they can’t cope with it. They have too many men to be trained on too many weapons, in too short a time, with too many diversions. We know from testing that the difference between a well-trained crew and an average crew is very great. It can range from 20 to 50 percent of effectiveness, sometimes even more. So, that means you can get more combat effectiveness by increasing the performance of the unit than you ever could by putting new weapons in it. Well, that’s what Division 86 is all about — an effort to improve performance by improving quality, by increasing the leadership mix, and through simplification by reducing the size of units so that the tactical and technical training comes back down to manageable levels.
It’s interesting to see how poorly this assessment turned out to be. The XM-1 of course became the Abrams, which we still use over 40 years later in a much-improved version but based mainly on the same fundamental design.
There is certainly a lot more technology for your average tanker to master in the modern Abrams — radios, gps units, firing computers — and yet we have good experience with privates of average intelligence being able to handle those functions perfectly adequately — no need for all those extra warrants and lieutenants.
Comparing any ground vehicle to an aviation platform (where, yes, above-average training and intellect for quick decision making in a complex, multi-variable environment is required), is really kind of silly, and the more you think about it, the more I start to question what Gen. DePuy was thinking.
Well, the interview took place in 1977, so it’s that period between the end of the draft/Vietnam and the Reagan build-up when the quality of recruits is generally agreed to be extremely poor. The all-volunteer force was new and on the verge of failing. Also before the introduction of simulator training. Also before the Montgomery GI bill (1984), which brought in a lot of college-bound recruits at the enlisted level. In period context, one college graduate per tank was probably realistic.